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THE ARMSTRONG EVOLUTION 
MICHAEL PAPPAS* 
According to the Supreme Court, the central tenet of modern Fifth 
Amendment takings jurisprudence is as follows: 
 “[T]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . was designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the pub-
lic as a whole.”1 
Taken from Armstrong v. United States,2 the above quote is termed “the 
Armstrong principle,” and it has appeared in thousands of takings cases.  It 
stresses the ideas of comparative fairness and justice and leads courts to in-
quire whether individual property owners have been “singled out” to bear 
outsized burdens. 
In a forthcoming work, Singled Out, I criticize the role that the Arm-
strong principle plays in the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence and be-
yond.3  As background for that article, this Essay traces how the Supreme 
Court elevated the Armstrong principle, seemingly without reflection, from 
a rhetorical flourish into an espoused takings dogma.  Additionally, this Es-
say examines the true impact (or lack thereof) of the Armstrong principle on 
case outcomes.  Finally, this Essay challenges whether the Armstrong princi-
ple represents a meaningful approach to evaluating takings claims.  The Arm-
strong principle suggests that takings issues should be evaluated via a com-
parative distributional inquiry that assesses an individual relative to her 
neighbors.  This Essay argues that such a suggestion is misguided, both de-
scriptively and normatively.  It posits that that a more accurate and desirable 
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 1.  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 2.  Id. at 40. 
 3.  See Michael Pappas, Singled Out, 76 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2016) (manuscript 
at 7). 
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description of the takings question involves an individualist inquiry that as-
sesses the position of a property owner before and after regulation, regardless 
of her comparative position relative to her neighbors.  
A.  The Evolution of the Armstrong Principle from a Paraphrase into a 
Test 
The Court has come to endorse the Armstrong principle as the central 
inquiry in takings cases, as well as a stand-alone test for finding a taking.  
However, it was not originally articulated as such.  Rather, Justice Black’s 
oft-quoted passage in Armstrong4 was merely a paraphrase of the general idea 
behind the Fifth Amendment.  However, subsequent opinions gradually ele-
vated the general idea to a takings test of its own.5  This Section tracks how 
the Armstrong test crept into being through imprecision, overstatement, and 
oversight. 
Justice Black first articulated what would become the Armstrong prin-
ciple not as a takings test, but rather as a statement of the general motivation 
behind the Fifth Amendment’s compensation requirement.  In ruling that a 
compensable taking arose when materialmen’s liens were transferred to the 
United States, Justice Black’s majority opinion in Armstrong reasoned that 
“[t]he total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which 
constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth 
Amendment ‘taking.’”6  Thus, the takings test embraced in the opinion was 
whether the government had destroyed the value of the property.  The entirety 
of the Court’s analytical work to determine whether a taking had occurred 
centered on this question, and it merely involved comparing the property’s 
value before and after the government action.7  Then, with the analysis com-
plete, Justice Black’s closing sentences offered a sweeping summation, in-
cluding a general statement encapsulating the broad terms of the “Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee.”8  Justice Black concluded the opinion with a rhe-
torical flourish, stating: 
 The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not 
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed 
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
                                                          
 4.  See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Allure of Consequential Fit, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1261, 1285 
(2000) (noting that federal published takings cases have quoted Justice Black’s opinion 121 times). 
 5.  This is not the first time such confusion has come from repetition; a similar problem gave 
rise to Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 6.  Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48.  
 7.  See id. 
 8.  See id. at 49. 
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public as a whole.  A fair interpretation of this constitutional pro-
tection entitles these lienholders to just compensation here.9 
And so the Armstrong principle was born. 
Since then, Justice Black’s language has been widely embraced in sub-
sequent Supreme Court opinions.  While many have cited the language con-
sistent with its initial use as a broad description of the Fifth Amendment guar-
antee,10 a series of cases has also morphed the meaning of the Armstrong 
language, aggrandizing it from a general Fifth Amendment summary to a 
stand-alone measure of whether a taking has occurred.11 
The rise of the Armstrong principle as a test began in 1978 with then-
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York.12  In arguing that the regulation preventing Penn Central from de-
veloping a skyscraper above Grand Central Station amounted to a taking, 
Justice Rehnquist not only referenced the Armstrong principle as the general 
concept behind the Fifth Amendment,13 but also added Armstrong’s compar-
ative fairness language into his takings analysis.14  The dissent stressed that 
the facts of the case, where the regulated property owner bore a multimillion-
dollar burden but received no offsetting benefit, offended the fairness pur-
pose behind the Fifth Amendment.15  As Justice Rehnquist put it: 
If the cost of preserving Grand Central Terminal were spread 
evenly across the entire population of the city of New York, the 
                                                          
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Notably, Justice Brennan’s canonical Penn Central majority opinion echoed the Armstrong 
principle for its general Fifth Amendment summation.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City 
(Penn Central), 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978).  Additionally, this general principle was repeated in 
a number of takings and exaction cases since.  See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 
(2001); Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998) (finding general purpose and to some 
degree incorporated the Penn Central analysis in terms of character of government action); Dolan 
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992); 
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9 (1988); id. at 19 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. City of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 318–19 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 512–13 
(1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 
621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 
155, 163 (1980) (providing a general conceptual reference). 
 11.  See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause 
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 877 (1995). 
 12.  438 U.S. at 138.  It is no coincidence that the rise of this test was part of the Rehnquist 
Court, which is known for its property-rights project.  Notably, Justice Stevens joined this dissent, 
but would later apply the Armstrong principle in Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 320–21 (2002). 
 13.  In addition to quoting Armstrong, Justice Rehnquist also relied on a similar general state-
ment about the Fifth Amendment from Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 
312, 337 (1893).  Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 146 n.9 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 14.  Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 140. 
 15.  Id. at 147–50.  
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burden per person would be in cents per year—a minor cost appel-
lees would surely concede for the benefit accrued. Instead, how-
ever, appellees would impose the entire cost of several million dol-
lars per year on Penn Central. But it is precisely this sort of 
discrimination that the Fifth Amendment prohibits.16 
Justice Rehnquist’s analysis, which repeatedly emphasized the magni-
tude of the multimillion dollar burden, relied on individualist considera-
tions.17  However, by stressing not just the size of the burden but also the fact 
that it was borne unevenly, his dissent coupled comparative concepts with 
the individualist conclusion that the multimillion dollar burden itself was 
simply too large a diminution in value to impose without compensation.  
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent injected distributional concerns by 
stating that the Fifth Amendment protects against “discrimination” (as op-
posed to uncompensated destruction of value, as identified in Armstrong).18  
Thus, Justice Rehnquist laid the foundation for a takings test based totally on 
comparative fairness. 
Then-Justice Rehnquist continued his advancement of the comparative 
takings inquiry in a 1980 opinion, where he wrote for a unanimous court.19  
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,20 the Court held that no taking 
arose when a California provision required a shopping center to allow speech 
and petitioning on its premises.  When introducing the takings doctrine, the 
opinion cast the Armstrong principle as the overall test for determining 
whether a taking has occurred and described it as the overarching inquiry into 
which the Penn Central factors fit.  The opinion states: 
[T]he determination whether a state law unlawfully infringes a 
landowner’s property in violation of the Taking[s] Clause requires 
an examination of whether the restriction on private property 
“forc[es] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”  
This examination entails inquiry into such factors as the character 
of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interfer-
ence with reasonable investment-backed expectations.21 
                                                          
 16.  Id. at 148–49 (emphasis added). 
 17.  In fact, some might argue that the analysis centered on this individualist analysis and that 
the reasoning was not truly distributivist at all.  Justice Rehnquist was apparently motivated by the 
diminution of value created by the multimillion dollar burden (the same concern that is the first 
Penn Central factor and that motivated the analysis in Armstrong).  See id. at 147–50. 
 18.  Id. at 149. 
 19.  Justice Blackmun joined except for one sentence.  See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins 
(Prune Yard), 447 U.S. 74, 88–89 (1980). 
 20.  Id. at 74. 
 21.  Id. at 82–83 (citation omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) 
and citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)). 
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Thus, it presents the takings question as an examination of comparative fair-
ness in which the individualistic Penn Central factors are points of inquiry.  
However, in determining that the provision at issue in the case was not a 
taking, the opinion employed no true comparative analysis.  Rather, it rea-
soned that requiring PruneYard to allow speech, subject to time, place, and 
manner restrictions, did not “unreasonably impair the value or use of their 
property as a shopping center.”22 Thus, the takings decision was actually 
grounded in the individualist question of how much the regulation reduced 
property values and expectations rather than any true comparative question.  
Nonetheless, the language and conception of the comparative takings test 
continued to gain traction. 
Following PruneYard, the Court briefly mentioned the comparative tak-
ings test as a supplement to the individualist Penn Central factors in Connolly 
v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.23 and Bowen v. Gilliard,24 but the next 
major announcement of the comparative Armstrong standard as a stand-alone 
takings measure came from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission.25  In a footnote of dicta, Justice Scalia rec-
ognized the Armstrong principle as a separate test for takings.26  Reflecting 
the comparative principle that being singled out for a burden is sufficient to 
show a taking, without examination of the magnitude of that burden, the foot-
note read: 
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of Califor-
nia’s attempt to remedy these problems, although they had not con-
tributed to it more than other coastal landowners, the State’s action, 
even if otherwise valid, might violate either the incorporated Tak-
ings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.  One of the principal 
purposes of the Takings Clause is “to bar Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”  But that is not 
the basis of the Nollans’ challenge here.27 
Though of limited precedential value, the unchallenged, gratuitous footnote28 
offers another indication of the Court’s growing acceptance of a comparative 
takings test.29 
                                                          
 22.  Id. at 83. 
 23.  475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986).  
 24.  483 U.S. 587, 606–08 (1987).  
 25.  483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 26.  Id. at 835 n.4. 
 27.  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, (1960) and 
citing Sandiego Gas & Elec. Co., v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)).  
 28.  There is no indication of other members of the majority not joining the footnote or of the 
dissent taking issue with it. 
 29.  See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632–33 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
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Justice Stevens next incorporated a comparative test in Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Authority,30 where the 
Court considered whether a moratorium on development constituted a per se 
taking.31  Justice Stevens’s majority opinion endorsed the Armstrong princi-
ple as a stand-alone measure of takings liability, with a section of the opinion 
going so far as to premise its reasoning on “why the Armstrong principle 
requires rejection” of the petitioners’ arguments.32  Ultimately, the Court re-
fused to recognize the petitioners’ proposed per se rule based on both prior 
case law and a policy-driven argument inquiring into “whether the concepts 
of ‘fairness and justice’ that underlie the Takings Clause will be better served 
by one of these categorical rules or by a Penn Central inquiry into all of the 
relevant circumstances in particular cases.”33  Rejecting the per se rule, Jus-
tice Stevens’s opinion further relied on comparative concerns, noting that 
“with a temporary ban on development there is a lesser risk that individual 
landowners will be ‘singled out’ to bear a special burden that should be 
shared by the public as a whole.  At least with a moratorium there is a clear 
‘reciprocity of advantage.’”34  Thus, the opinion considered comparative fair-
ness as a guiding principle counseling against adoption of a per se takings 
rule and as a metric for finding the likelihood of takings concerns. 
Finally, Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the unanimous Court in Lingle 
v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.35 recognized the comparative takings test in the con-
text of a holding expressly aimed at delineating which concepts were and 
were not appropriate for the takings inquiry.  In Lingle, the Court sought to 
clarify whether the “substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests” in-
quiry, which had been used in a series of prior takings cases, was actually a 
proper test for determining whether a regulation constituted a regulatory tak-
ing of property.36  The Court held that it was not, concluding that the “sub-
stantially advances” formula was a due process inquiry rather than a takings 
concern.  In explicating the scope of proper takings inquiries, the Court noted 
the importance of the individualist takings question, stating, “each of these 
[takings] tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that govern-
ment imposes upon private property rights.”37  However, the opinion also 
endorsed distributional concerns, identifying the Armstrong principle as the 
                                                          
 30.  535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 31.  Id. at 306. 
 32.  Id. at 321. 
 33.  Id. at 334. 
 34.  Id. at 341 (first quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 (1987); and 
then quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). 
 35.  544 U.S. 528 (2005).  The opinion was unanimous, though Justice Kennedy added a con-
currence as well.  Id. at 548.  
 36.  Id. at 531–32 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
 37.  Id. at 539 (emphasis added). 
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justification for the takings doctrine38 and stating that along with individualist 
inquiries into the magnitude of a burden on private property, an alternative 
takings inquiry also asks “how any regulatory burden is distributed among 
property owners.”39  The Court identified this distributive question as coequal 
with the individualist one, declaring that takings inquiries should examine 
“the actual burden imposed on property rights, or how that burden is allo-
cated.”40  Moreover, in criticizing the claimant’s failure to articulate a cog-
nizable takings claim, the Court stated that “[i]n short, Chevron has not 
clearly argued—let alone established—that it has been singled out to bear 
any particularly severe regulatory burden,” implying that “singling out” is 
the crux of a colorable takings claim.41  That the unanimous Court articulated 
the centrality of a comparative test in the course of a decision premised on 
bringing clarity and precision to the takings inquiry is telling; Lingle evi-
dences no accidental allusion to comparative questions but rather articulates 
comparative fairness as an independent takings test.  As such, it represents 
the final step in the metamorphosis of the Armstrong principle from a general 
statement of Fifth Amendment concepts to a stand-alone takings inquiry. 
Over the course of these cases between Armstrong and Lingle, the Court 
incrementally adopted a comparative takings test without ever truly examin-
ing the logic or implication of such an approach.  However, such a test is 
misguided both theoretically and practically.  While the Armstrong principle 
makes sense as a statement about the Fifth Amendment’s overall grounding 
in the idea of fairness, it cannot withstand conceptual scrutiny as a test for 
whether a taking has occurred.  In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey, LLC,42 the Court actually acknowledged a similar conceptual 
problem with applying the Armstrong principle too directly as a takings test. 
Del Monte Dunes, however, was in the context of distinguishing between 
takings and exactions inquiries, and the Court has not had another oppor-
tunity to recognize the parallel problem with the comparative takings test.  In 
Del Monte Dunes, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion clarified that the pro-
portionality test employed in exactions cases is distinct from the determina-
tion for whether a regulatory taking of property has occurred.43  In explaining 
the difference, the Court briefly addressed Armstrong, noting that: 
 Although in a general sense concerns for proportionality animate 
the Takings Clause, see Armstrong v. United States, 365 U.S. 40, 
49 (1960) (“The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . was designed 
                                                          
 38.  Id. at 537. 
 39.  Id. at 542 (emphasis added). 
 40.  Id. at 543 (emphasis added). 
 41.  Id. at 544. 
 42.  526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
 43.  Id. at 702–03. 
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to bar [the] Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole”), we have not extended the rough-pro-
portionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of exac-
tions . . . .44 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy reasoned, “[the proportionality test] was not de-
signed to address, and is not readily applicable to, the much different ques-
tions arising where, as here, [the case presents a regulatory taking issue].  We 
believe, accordingly, that the rough-proportionality test of Dolan is inappo-
site to a case such as this one.”45 
The distinction Justice Kennedy’s opinion draws between the propor-
tionality and takings inquiries is similar to the distinction between the com-
parative fairness inquiry and the takings inquiry.  Though a general concern 
for comparative fairness underscores the Takings Clause, the comparative 
question is inapposite regarding whether a property expectation has been 
taken.  The question of fairness is fundamentally different from the question 
of whether a regulation has gone too far because comparative fairness is not 
a relevant touchstone for measuring changes in property expectations. 
Just because Armstrong articulates an overarching Fifth Amendment 
principle does not make it a meaningful or appropriate takings inquiry. The 
Fifth Amendment guarantees fairness by mandating that when property is 
taken compensation is to be paid; this is the fairness concept to which Arm-
strong adheres.  However, this promise of fairness via compensation does 
nothing to inform the threshold question of whether property has, in fact, 
been taken.  Whether a property has been taken is a question about the change 
in property expectations from before the regulation to after the regulation, 
and this is a question that the Armstrong principle is not suited to answer. 
B.  Non-Application and Misinformation from the Armstrong Test 
Among the strongest evidence that the Armstrong principle is unwork-
able as a takings test is that, despite the Court’s continued repetition of it, it 
has never done any work as a takings test.  A survey of takings cases in the 
Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state courts, indicates that despite 
the Court’s announced allegiance to a comparative measure of takings em-
bodied by the Armstrong principle, the Court does not actually resolve tak-
ings cases on these grounds.  While the Court dutifully repeats the compara-
tive takings inquiry, it actually applies individualist measures, and thus the 
Court’s invocation of the Armstrong test vastly overstates the amount that the 
Armstrong principle influences decisions, if it influences them at all.  As a 
                                                          
 44.  Id. at 702. 
 45.  Id. at 703 (emphasis added). 
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result, the Court misinforms property owners and regulators that take the 
comparative language at its word and view it as a measure of takings coequal 
with the individualist takings standards.46 
Of the many takings cases that repeat the Armstrong standard,47 few if 
any actually turn on this comparative inquiry.48  While it is difficult to prove 
the negative proposition that courts announce the Armstrong principle as a 
standalone takings test but then do not actually use that test to influence the 
result, the review of the Supreme Court cases discussed above supports that 
conclusion.  Though the opinions in PruneYard, Nolan, and Lingle go out of 
their way to incorporate the Armstrong principle as more than just a general 
statement about the Fifth Amendment, the comparative analysis does not ap-
pear to be the primary grounds, if any grounds, for the decision in any of 
these cases.49  The Court’s opinion in Tahoe-Sierra comes the closest to ac-
tually using the Armstrong principle, but even there it is supplemental to 
other case law analysis. 
Moreover, an analysis of all citations to the Armstrong principle in 
lower federal courts and state courts indicates the same result: that the Arm-
strong principle is oft-cited but never the ultimate grounds for resolving a 
case.  These cases citing Armstrong tend to fall into one of four categories.  
First, some cases simply cite and repeat the Armstrong principle, usually as 
a general tenet of takings law.50  Second, some cases cite the Armstrong prin-
ciple as a component of one of the factors in the Penn Central balancing test 
or cite Armstrong as an addition after applying an individualist takings meas-
ure.51  Third, some cases cite Armstrong in reliance on its narrow holding to 
support the assertion that liens or comparable types of property amount to 
property interests for the purposes of the takings clause.52  Finally, a fourth 
                                                          
 46.  See Pappas, supra note 3, at Part III.A.4. 
 47.  See supra Part A; see also Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2008). 
 48.  See Davidson supra note 47, at 44. 
 49.  Cf. Nadav Shoked, Response, Property’s Perspective (or of Whom to be Jealous), 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 118 (2013), https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-
118.pdf (arguing that the cases on which Strahilevitz relies for relativism actually resolve on abso-
lutist grounds). 
 50.  A full citation to the hundreds of cases that fall in this category is on file with the author.  
A representative sample of cases includes: Cape Ann Citizens Ass’n v. City of Gloucester, No. 96-
2327, 1997 WL 459079, at *4 (1st Cir. Aug. 13, 1997); Valles v. Pima County, 776 F. Supp. 2d 
995, 1003 (D. Ariz. 2011); Town of Gurley v. M & N Materials, Inc., 143 So. 3d 1, 20 (Ala. 2012).   
 51.  A full citation to the hundreds of cases that fall in this category is on file with the author.  
A representative sample of cases includes: Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 42 (1st Cir. 
2002); Golden Gate Hotel Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 864 F. Supp. 917, 925 (N.D. Cal. 
1993); Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 641–42 (Minn. 2007). 
 52.  A full citation to the many cases that fall in this category is on file with the author.  A 
representative sample of cases includes: 1256 Hertel Ave. Assocs., LLC v. Calloway, 761 F.3d 252, 
263 (2d Cir. 2014); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 839 (Cal. 1982). 
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set of cases cites Armstrong for the general propositions that the destruction 
or seizure of valuable property can amount to a taking but that not every gov-
ernment action affecting property is necessarily a taking.53  There are also 
cases that fall outside of these categories,54 but, again, none applies Arm-
strong as the primary (or even major) source of reasoning or decision in a 
case.  Of all these cases, none of them offers a robust or even meaningful 
application of the Armstrong principle as a test for whether a taking has oc-
curred. 
C.  Administrability 
Finally, a comparative measure of takings creates administrability prob-
lems by introducing an undefined set of possible comparators to the takings 
inquiry.  Individualist measures for takings may involve muddied, ad hoc 
factual inquiries, but at least the comparators are defined and identifiable: a 
court can consider the situation of the property holder pre-regulation and 
post-regulation.  A comparative measure lacks this definition of relevant 
comparators; asking if an individual is singled out or bears an excessive bur-
den begs further questions.  Against whom and how many others should the 
court compare?  For example, does a regulation single out a property owner 
if it affects only one, only ten, only one hundred, or only one thousand?  Does 
there need to be a count of all parties affected by a regulation before mean-
ingfully determining whether some are singled out?  Moreover, the compar-
ative inquiry also forces a question of how abstractly to define the burden—
too narrowly and a singling out is almost certain; too broadly and the more 
distributed the burden appears.55  A comparative takings inquiry is “inher-
ently indeterminate,”56 introducing additional subjectivity to an already ad 
hoc doctrine.  Moreover, this indeterminacy helps explain why the compara-
tive language is so often coupled with an actually individualist analysis under 
the Penn Central factors; those at least give some criteria to evaluate.  As 
Justice O’Connor put it, in a marvelous example of understatement, “[t]he 
                                                          
 53.  A full citation to the many cases that fall in this category is on file with the author.  A 
representative sample of cases includes: In re Metmor Financial, Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 450–51 (4th 
Cir. 1987); Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 542 (D.C. 2011). 
 54.  A full citation to the many cases that fall in this category is on file with the author.  A 
representative sample of cases includes: United States v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 258 F. Supp. 
2d 804 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (considering how Armstrong might influence a Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection analysis); Abney v. Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1230 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff was rightfully meant to bear a public burden but that the Armstrong test was 
moot because the case was governed by the Due Process Clause); Alto Eldorado Partners v. City of 
Santa Fe, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1218–20 (D.N.M. 2009) (addressing a claim by the plaintiffs that 
Armstrong’s relativist language reduces the requirement of ripeness for Takings Claims and finding 
that the test only applies to ensuring compensation for unfair government takings). 
 55.  See, e.g., Shoked, supra note 49, at 124.  
 56.  Davidson, supra note 47, at 37–38. 
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concepts of ‘fairness and justice’ that underlie the Takings Clause, of course, 
are less than fully determinate.”57  This Essay suggests that the concepts are 
so much less than fully determinate that they make for a takings test that is 
both unworkable and illogical. 
Moreover, there are serious questions involving the institutional com-
petence of courts as arbiters of such a fairness test.  As Buzz Thompson has 
noted, “[g]iven the absence of any fairness criterion inherent in the takings 
protections themselves, a fairness rationale also raises the question of why 
the courts are a more appropriate institution than Congress to determine the 
fairest means of allocating the cost of particular public goods or services.”58 
A comparative approach frustrates the takings analysis and also works 
against the predictability that the Court has attempted to introduce to the tak-
ings inquiry through the adoption of bright-line, per se takings standards. A 
distributivist measure of takings is simply a more complex inquiry than an 
individualist measure, and as a result it is harder to administer. 
D.  Conclusion 
While Justice Black’s famous statement of the Armstrong principle 
might serve as a general articulation of the compensation requirement under-
lying the Fifth Amendment,59 it cannot serve as a meaningful test to deter-
mine whether property has been taken.  The Fifth Amendment embraces a 
general concept of fairness by requiring that compensation be paid when 
property is taken, and this compensation indeed plays a role in “bar[ring] 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”60  It 
accomplishes this by dispersing burdens among taxpayers.  But, the Fifth 
Amendment’s concern with fairness arises only after the requisite finding 
that a taking has occurred. 
However, the inquiry as to whether a taking has, in fact, occurred should 
incorporate no comparative fairness question.  It should merely ask whether 
regulation has gone too far in reducing property expectations.  To identify a 
taking, a court needs to ask first whether a property interest exists and, if so, 
whether a regulation has gone too far from a recognized baseline of expecta-
tions to amount to a taking.  This inquiry does not require comparing one 
property owner to another because the Fifth Amendment does not call for 
compensation whenever property is treated relatively differently.  Rather, it 
calls for compensation when property is taken, and the question of a taking 
                                                          
 57.  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 58.  Thompson, supra note 4, at 1287; see also id. at 1296.  
 59.  That is, it may inform why compensation is paid. 
 60.  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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revolves around a reduction of the number of sticks in the bundle, not a com-
parison to other bundles.  Thus, while the concept of fairness and justice ex-
plains the need to compensate, it does not provide a measure for whether a 
taking has occurred. 
The Armstrong principle is simply not suited for identifying takings.  
But, then again, the Armstrong language was never meant to do so.  Takings 
cases have canonized Justice Black’s words as an article of faith, but this faith 
has been a blind one.  Through rote and imprecision, the Court has mytholo-
gized a turn of phrase into a fundamental principle of the takings inquiry.  By 
tracing the Armstrong evolution, this Essay seeks to demystify the Armstrong 
principle and clarify its place in the takings jurisprudence. 
